

Party Competition in Western Europe

Changing Contexts

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What we did last week...

- defining polarization
- distinguish between affective and policy polarization
- learning how political parties (most notably the far-right) contribute to (policy) polarization
- making data accessible for analyses on voters

Plan for today

We'll talk about societal transformations (of the labor market) and how they affected political outcomes

- review the idea of the *modernization losers* thesis by Kriesi (2008)
- discuss how *actual* change in labor market condition creates equilibrium and grievances
- debate whether *economic risk prospects* are driving success for the far-right

What did globalization brought to you?

Think a minute: What has globalization brought to you, i.e., what would have been missing if there was no globalization? Did it also come with challenges?

Consequences of globalization

Globalization has initiated a multitude of changes...

- institutionalization of supranational structures → changes in political authority and national sovereignty
- market dependencies → race to the bottom? or compensation of adverse effects of globalization?
- heightened levels of mobility (capital and people)
- cultural pluralization

Two mechanisms

There are at least two major dimensions in the relationship between globalization and political grievances (cf. Rathgeb and Busemeyer 2022):

1. **economic** mechanism: de-regulation and labor market competition may lead to a *realistic* group conflict that has material consequences (Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998)
2. **cultural** mechanism: debordering and pluralization of societies lead to conflicts over identity and symbols (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012)

Unequal effects on the population

As Kriesi (2008) notes, globalization produces *winners* and *losers*

- *winners* benefit from increased mobility
- *losers* do not benefit but may be confronted (or fear) increased labor market competition and threatened most by deregulation

A new cleavage arising?

The transformative strength of globalization has repeatedly been linked to a reshuffling of the political space (cf. Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). Globalization winners turn out for left-libertarian parties, losers for the authoritarian right.

- focus long on cultural mechanism (Ivarsflaten 2007)
- recently more attention to economic implications of globalization

Two readings



Two readings

Today, we are splitting the seminar into two groups. Half of the seminar discusses the article by Abou-Chadi and Kurer (2021), the other half engages with Gallego, Kurer, and Schöll (2022).

We proceed in three steps:

- Half of each group discusses research question and argument, the other half talks about research design and the results (4 groups)
- Now, form new groups which are comprised of (at least) one representative of the four smaller groups; briefly update each other on your findings and discuss similarities and differences between the readings. What are potential implications?
- Each group discusses questions which have been submitted by seminar participants

Afterwards, we reconvene and collect your insights and questions.

Two readings

For the first group task, please join the Flinga session:



Figure: URL: <https://flinga.fi/s/FXRVGWQ>

Neither left behind nor superstar

- **Research Question:**
- **Main Argument:**
- **Data and Method:**
- **Results:**
- **Implications:**

Technologization and political behavior

Ongoing debate about how automation reshapes working conditions.

But does it change political dynamics as well?

- technologization can have two divergent effects: *displacement* of workforce and *productivity boosts* potentially threatening for jobs based on routine tasks
- main assumption: individuals behave rationally, they consider their economic situation when participating in politics

Gallego, Kurer, and Schöll (2022) outline four potential effects that connect economic experiences with political behavior. Which ones?

Technologization and political behavior

1. *party vote*: if citizens are exposed to material hardship, they are more inclined to support parties with redistributive platforms
2. *incumbency*: if their economic situation deteriorates, voters held the incumbent parties accountable for it
3. *anti-system*: economic hardship erodes voters' trust in system → they vote anti-system parties (e.g. the far-right)
4. *turnout*: loss in self-efficacy (or lack of resources) reduce turnout-

All of this is moderated by education? Why? Is it appropriate?
What would be an alternative?

Data and Measures

Industry-specific indicator of digitalization from EU KLEMS dataset

$$D_{jt} = \frac{\text{ICT Capital Stock}_{jt}}{\text{Employees}_{jt}} \quad (1)$$

What's the indicator basically measuring? What are pros and cons for using it?

Data and Measures

They combine the measure with data from the British Household Panel

- set of political outcome variables (turnout, political attitudes [not vote choice!])
- main moderator: educational level

Data and Measures

The “Next Best Alternative” to Randomized Experiments: Instrumental Variables (IV)

- Key idea: “induce” randomization on exposure that can’t be randomized via an **instrument**.




Figure: The Instrumental Variables Approach [Source](#)

Data and Measures

What's an instrumental variables approach? Why do Gallego, Kurer, and Schöll (2022) use it? What's the instrument they use? What might be the issue with regard to their case selection?

Results




Figure: Effects of technological change on economic prospects (by education)

Who wins, who loses from technologization? How large are both groups?

Results




Figure: Effects of TC on turnout, Conservative Vote, Labour Vote and Incumbency Vote

How does exposure to technologization affect people's political behavior?

Results




Figure: Effects of TC on UKIP vote

Why don't those who lose go to the left?

Results


- **Research Question:** How does workplace technologization influence political outcomes?
- **Main Argument:** Technologization has education-specific effects on economic outlooks which translate into political behavior
- **Data and Method:** Combination of industry investment on ICT and panel data; multivariate regression + IV approach
- **Results:** Those with education win and stabilize the system; those lacking formal education lose and lead to systemic disruption
- **Implications:** Voters factor in their economic situation when participating in politics

Economic Risks and Voting for the Far-Right

- **Research Question:**
- **Main Argument:**
- **Data and Method:**
- **Results:**
- **Implications:**

Potential outcomes of household economic risk

A visualized description of the argument by Abou-Chadi and Kurer (2021):



Potential outcomes of household economic risk

How do the authors explain preference for the far-right in case of economic risk perception?

Potential outcomes of household economic risk

In a simplified way, voters fearing economic status loss decline have two choices

1. vote for the left: social protection by welfare state expansion (particularly of security nets like unemployment schemes)
2. vote for the far-right: protection by exclusion (welfare to the deserving: *the native population*)

Potential outcomes of household economic risk

Gendered effects

- women more likely to adjust their preferences to male household member (why?)

Data and Methods

Combination of macro-level index of economic risk with cross-sectional, cross-temporal survey research from the European Social Survey

- DV: vote for the far-right
- main IV: own economic risk + economic risk of spouse (basically, average unemployment rate in a given occupational group)
- moderator: gender

Data and Methods

Questions on the data:

- is economic risk the right indicator?
- which groups are missing in the sample?

Results




Figure: Risk distribution by occupational group

Results

TABLE 1
UNEMPLOYMENT RISK AND RADICAL-RIGHT VOTING

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Unemployment risk	7.957** (1.194)	6.467** (1.075)	9.423** (1.995)
Unemployment risk – Partner		5.101** (1.069)	8.214** (1.737)
Unemployment risk × Unemployment risk – Partner			–38.743* (17.754)
Unemployed	0.148 (0.134)	0.137 (0.134)	0.131 (0.133)
Partner unemployed	–0.006 (0.353)	–0.058 (0.353)	–0.078 (0.349)
Income	–0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.003 (0.018)

Figure: Main relationship between unemployment risks and far-right vote

Let's try to make sense of the numbers...

Results




Figure: Effect of household unemployment risks and far-right vote by gender

How are men different from women with regard to economic risks and far-right vote?

Results

Questions on results:

- Any missing moderators?

Results

- **Research Question:** Does economic risk bolster support for the far-right?
- **Main Argument:** Household's risk prospects not current individual economic hardship foster far-right voting
- **Data and Method:** Cross-sectional study with macro-level risk indicator + ESS data on political attitudes
- **Results:** Heightened economic risk in a household increases probability of far-right vote, with gendered patterns of status loss
- **Implications:** Individual voting behavior is influenced by reference network and voters do not simply vote for the far-right because of economic considerations

What we've done today...

- introduce the modernization losers theory
- discuss two studies on the implications of economic changes for political behavior

To prepare for next week...

- Next session will be our first roundtable session.
- For those who are signed up for the essay next week, please submit the essay by Sunday night
- The others are assigned to one essay and read it in advance to the session: please prepare comments on the essay!

Thank you for your attention!
Any further questions?

Literature



Abou-Chadi T and Kurer T (2021) Economic Risk within the Household and Voting for the Radical Right. *World Politics* 73 (3), 482–511.



Esses VM, Jackson LM, and Armstrong TL (1998) Intergroup Competition and Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration: An Instrumental Model of Group Conflict. *Journal of Social Issues* 54 (4), 699–724.



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Ivarsflaten E (2007) What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?: Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases. *Comparative Political Studies* **41** (1), 3–23.



Kriesi H (2008) *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.



Lucassen G and Lubbers M (2012) Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats. *Comparative Political Studies* **45** (5), 547–574.

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