In this dissertation I analyse and criticise the recent theory of political liberalism of John Rawls and Charles Larmore. Furthermore, I sketch an alternative solution to the challenge which this theory confronts. The main challenge in the political liberalism of Rawls and Larmore is the difficult reconciliation between, on the one hand, the value of justice seen as the ultimate and substantive standard for the assessment of institutions and policies and, on the other hand, the pervasive pluralism of ideas of the good life and their supporting world views, in contemporary liberal societies. Political liberalism reconciles these by considering that principles of justice can be consensual in a pluralist society because they are political, not comprehensive (according to Rawls) or neutral in their justifications (according to Larmore). In this way, contentious moralities and philosophies, whether religious or not, are precluded from political justification. 
	I show the unfeasibility of this justificatory restraint both at the level of the idea of justice and in the account of pluralism provided by the advocates of political liberalism. Their implicit theories of pluralism require philosophical fallibilism in order to make sense. Moreover, the hidden perfectionism in the justification of the principles of justice advanced by political liberals goes hand in hand with their pluralist views. These 'contaminations', so to speak, of supposedly political principles by controversial epistemological and moral doctrines show the internal defects of political liberalism. 
	Furthermore, political liberalism cannot keep its promise of consensus because the idea of justice is itself plural. This is due, among other factors, to the influence of personal experiences and the weight of different considerations (i.e., the "burdens of reason") not only in the formation of people's ideas of the good and world views but also in the process of conceptualizing justice. Once one recognizes the relevance of the pluralism of the former, one must also admit the equal relevance of the pluralism of the latter. 
	Political liberals were certainly right in facing the challenge of pluralism. However, political liberalism is unsuccessful in the avoidance of contaminations and it is also useless when it no longer provides the hope of a consensus that would strengthen the cause of justice amidst pluralism. If one perseveres to find a solution to the initial challenge, one must abandon the reconciliation proposed by political liberalism and re-interpret what it means to use restraint in a pluralist society. Instead of restraint as philosophical avoidance, my alternative proposal is a view of restraint as responsibility. Some specific institutions in liberal societies allow for the rule of conflict through suffrage. Responsibility amounts to moral support for this set of institutions, although they are not just. However, convictions of justice must remain in place. I conclude that liberal arguments for justice should preserve the controversy of deep - or comprehensive, or non-neutral - convictions, while accepting responsibly the institutional limitations of this most important social virtue.