In the first chapter, joint with Andrej Sokol and Mario Porqueddu, we quantify the effects of wage bargaining shocks on macroeconomic aggregates. We identify exogenous variation in bargaining power from episodes of minimum wage introduction and industrial disputes. This narrative information disciplines impulse responses to a wage bargaining shock of unemployment and output, and sharpens inference. We also find that wage bargaining shocks explain a sizeable share of aggregate fluctuations in unemployment and inflation, that their pass-through to prices is very close to being full, and that they imply plausible dynamics for the vacancy rate, firms’ profits, and the labour share. In the second chapter, joint with Federica Brenna, we build a framework to extract judgement components from survey forecasts, and analyse to what extent it contributes to respondents’ disagreement. We find for average respondent a sizable contribution of judgement about current quarters, which steers unconditional forecasts towards the realisation, improving accuracy. We identify the structural components of judgement and give an economic interpretation to expected future shocks. For individual respondents, about one third of disagreement is due to differences in models used, the remaining comes from different assessments about future shocks; the latter mostly concern the size of shocks, while there is a general agreement on their source. Finally, in the third chapter, I focus on the extent to which public demand and procurement markets can affect individual firms. To do so, I build a novel database with firm-level data on US government procurement programs and establish the unpredictability of competitive contracts. I then explore the effects of procurement contracts on firms’ balance sheets and find a significant positive impact on winning firms’ sales, profits and investments. I show that public procurement can dampen perceived uncertainty and volatility associated with the firm in times of stringent financial conditions. I generalise my findings in a structural model, which provides a deeper understanding of the design of procurement markets and their interplay with public policies.