At the core of Boris Johnson’s Brexit is a conflict between ideology and geography. The purpose of the project is divergence – a competitive leap away from Europe into other markets. But that impulse to move is thwarted by the permanence of Britain’s location. No matter how much sovereignty the Eurosceptics claim over national regulation, governing a medium-sized power 30 miles from the coast of France will always require some accommodation with the interests of neighbouring states. EU membership was not the only possible way to manage those relationships, but it worked better than anything that had been tried in the preceding centuries, and nothing has been arranged to replace it. The Brexit withdrawal deal offers only a technical framework for economic partnership, and even that is unstable, as is clear from the ongoing negotiations over customs checks for Northern Ireland and operating licences for French fishers in UK waters. The two issues are not equivalent in scale. Much more is at stake on the island of Ireland, given the history of sectarian violence. But they flow from a common Brexit delusion, which is the belief that “taking back control” is a unilateral assertion. In reality, borders have two sides. The folly of ignoring that strategic geometry has been routinely demonstrated, most recently in a silly exchange of recriminations over migrant boat crossings in the Channel. The Home Office, being unable to stop the vessels, has tried blaming French authorities for failing to stop embarkations. France replies that the draw factor is lax British labour regulations that act as a magnet for refugees seeking a new life. French agenda Tensions on that front predate Brexit. The UK was not part of the Schengen common travel area, and policing of the Anglo-French border is governed by the bilateral Le Touquet accord. But the capacity for escalation is higher now that Britain has no seat around the EU table where other continental leaders meet. As it happens, France sets the agenda at that table for the first six months of 2022, as holder of the rotating council presidency. That means also that President Emmanuel Macron’s hawkish view of Britain’s obligations to uphold the Brexit agreement it signed will set the tone in Brussels. Since Mr Macron is seeking re-election in April, his attention will be more than usually focused on domestic matters. To the extent that those issues overlap with Brexit – as in the fisheries dispute – there will be pressure to take a hard line with London. There is a tendency in Downing Street to see Mr Macron’s stance as punitive to the point of spite. The Tory Eurosceptic view is that France, affronted by the temerity of Britannia in choosing freedom, is determined to prevent her from enjoying its benefits. That analysis contains a truth, filtered through a jaundiced lens. Mr Macron, in common with other EU leaders, understands that Brexit is a deliberate strategic challenge to the European project, based on the false premise that Britain could retain benefits of proximity to continental markets while using deregulation to outcompete EU businesses. Plainly, it is in the economic interests of member states for that not to happen. It is also in the interest of politicians who are committed to the logic of supranational solidarity that Euroscepticism be seen as a strategic cul-de-sac. Mr Macron is less patient than some of his continental counterparts for that point to be proven. As German chancellor, Angela Merkel took the view that British noses should not be rubbed too hard in the folly of Brexit, lest they be put out of joint. She feared Britain sliding even deeper into populism. Her successor, Olaf Scholz, is closer to Mr Macron’s position. Anglo-French relations are not helped by the low opinion that the French president has of Boris Johnson. He has been quoted describing the prime minister as “un clown”. He believes Mr Johnson is a deceitful and unreliable partner. A run of poor judgments and conspicuous dishonesties have made that assessment of Mr Johnson’s character indisputable. It is a settled view among many voters and formerly loyal Tory MPs that he is a liar. Provoking Brussels The resignation of David Frost, Johnson’s Brexit negotiator, compounded the domestic crisis engulfing No 10, but will not change the underlying dynamics in relations with the rest of Europe. Lord Frost was a zealot in pursuit of pure sovereignty and, in quitting, he signalled displeasure at compromises imposed from Downing Street. But the prime minister’s room to compromise is limited when so many of his MPs have lost faith in his judgment, already feel betrayed and are winding themselves towards a regicidal frenzy. That is also a consideration for Liz Truss, the foreign secretary, who inherits Lord Frost’s portfolio. She was a remainer in 2016, but her ambition to succeed Mr Johnson is a more salient factor for 2022. She, too, will be wary of alienating the hardliners. The incumbent prime minister’s insecurity might give him cause to prefer provocation in Brussels, on the ancient but shabby premise that foreign quarrels can galvanise domestic audiences. The threat of using Article 16 – the emergency brake in the Brexit deal – has receded while the government deals with another pandemic wave, but a prime minister with few other options keeps his finger on the trigger. Alternatively, he might calculate that a trade war with Brussels would be too expensive and compound the impression of a slide into chaos when what people crave most is a period of sustained, stable and grown-up government. In neither scenario is it likely that the prime minister will be thinking beyond short-term survival or acting with a strategic concept for Britain’s evolving relations with its neighbours. If there was ever such a capacity in Mr Johnson’s regime, it has been swept away in a cascade of crises. When the only purpose left for the prime minister is getting from one day to the next, there is no room for coherent foreign policy. And, since incoherence with regard to Europe is intrinsic to Brexit, there is no imminent prospect of restored stability in relations with Britain’s nearest neighbours. For that to happen, there has to be a resolution in the conflict between geography and ideology. Only one side can win, of course. The facts of Britain’s place in the world beat the fantasies of escaping it. Mr Johnson and his party might continue to postpone their own comprehension of that defeat. They cannot ultimately avoid it.